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ABSTRACT

The Presence of Adverse Selection in the
Las Vegas Resale Housing Market
by
Ryan M atthew Bledsoe
Dr. Bradley S. W iminer. Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor o f Economics
University o f Nevada. Las Vegas

Adverse selection may affect the resale housing market. Sellers hold valuable
inform ation concerning the quality o f their homes that is not directly available to buyers.
If buyers are unable to identify quality, the relocation decision is different for owners o f
low and high-quality houses. Since inform ation is asymmetric owners o f low-qualit>'
houses are more likely to relocate than owners o f high-quality houses, other things
constant. Thus, I suggest that quality is decreasing in the number o f tim es a house has
been resold. The presence o f a relationship behveen price and the num ber o f times a
house has been resold is consistent w ith the hypothesis that adverse selection influences
the resale housing market. My hedonic pricing model results supports this hypothesis.
Moreover, as a house’s turnover rate increases, consumer’s willingness to pay for that
house decreases, other things constant.

Ill
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric inform ation between market participants may adversely affect m arket
outcomes. When either buyer or seller possesses information about product quality that is
not directly observable to both market participants, a reduction o f mutually beneficial
trades may occur. This reduction in trade can be attributed to adverse selection.
.According to A kerlof (1970), adverse selection results because “there is an incentive for
sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue
mainly to the entire group whose statistic is affected rather than the individual seller”
(488 1970) Informational discrepancies compel less-informed market participants to
value the commodity at the expected value o f goods offered for sale. With varying
quality within a com m odity class, adverse selection potentially drives high-quality goods
out o f the market. This occurs when sellers o f high-quality goods are unable to com m and
their reservation price, since the presence o f low-quality goods decreases the expected
value o f goods offered for sale. In contrast, sellers o f low-quality goods are induced to
sell their product since the market price exceeds their reservation prices. Therefore, other
things equal, these low-quality goods are offered for sale more frequently than goods o f
higher quality .
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The resale housing market has been analyzed extensively throughout the literature;
however, potential adverse selection problems have not been addressed. An asymmetry
o f information is likely to exist in this market. Thus, I attempt to identify if adverse
selection hinders the resale market for single-fam ily residential homes. Owners possess
superior information about their home quality relative to potential buyers. Through direct
consumption o f housing serv ices, owners identify the quality o f their house’s amenities
that are not revealed to prospective buyers. These amenities may include plumbing,
wiring, foundation, environmental conditions, and neighborhood attributes. O n the other
hand, a prospective buyer would need to incur costs to get information. In m any cases
this information w ould be expensive.
Since information is asymmetric, buyers are willing to pay a price consistent with the
expected value o f hom es offered for sale. As such, reasons must exist for ow ners o f highquality houses to sell their good for a market to exist at all (Genesove, 1993). If
relocation is not optim al for owners o f high-quality houses, then only low-quality houses
are sold. In the resale housing market, some potential reasons for selling include
occupational relocation, to change neighborhoods, the taking o f house price appreciation,
and the desire to increase or decrease housing consum ption as income or fam ily size
changes. The effects o f adverse selection dim inish when there is an increase in the
percentage of sellers o f high-quality houses that find relocation optimal. This allows
even more high-quality products to be sold. However, high-quality goods sell for less
than they would w ith perfect information.
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Asymmetric information induces owners o f low-quality goods to sell their products,
resulting in low-quality goods being sold more frequently. Conversely, the probability
that a house is being sold o f a low quality, given it is offered for sale increases with the
frequency o f resale. A s the number o f tim es a house is resold increases, consumers reduce
their willingness to pay, other things constant. The presence o f asymmetric information
may result in adverse selection influencing market outcomes.
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CH.APTER 2

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE SELECTION
IN THE RESALE HOUSING M.ARKET
The following two exam ples identify potential housing market outcomes
characterized by adverse selection. These cases rely heavily on restrictive assumptions,
and they are presented for pedagogical purposes only rather than their realism or accurate
portrayal o f the housing market. First, “bad houses drive out good,” is an outcome
illustrative o f G resham ’s law. A second outcome is where mutually beneficial trades do
not decrease, but the price received by sellers o f high-quality houses in the market
declines relative to the perfect information outcome. In the latter case, sellers o f low and
high-quality houses receive a premium and discount for their goods, respectively. This
outcome occurs because consumers in markets characterized by asymmetric information
value goods at the expected value o f quality offered in the market. Both o f these
examples are analogous to an illustration developed in Kreps (1990).
In the first example, asymmetric information drives high-quality goods out o f the
market, resulting in the adverse selection o f low quality goods. Assume for simplicity
that there are exactly two types o f houses in the market: high and low-quality. Highquality homes are valued at 5300,000 by consumers, while owmers value them at
5250,000. Likewise, low-quality homes are valued at 5200,000 and 5100,000 by buyers
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and sellers, respectively. Secondly, assume that two out o f ever}' three houses in the
resale market are low-quality. In both examples, buyers are unable to identify quality;
whereas, sellers are certain about the quality o f their goods. This assumption results in
adverse selection influencing this market. Since consumers cannot identify qualit}', they
value each house at the expected value of resale homes in the market. In this case, if both
high and low-quality homes com e to market, buyers are w illing to pay $233,333.33,
realizing there is a 66 percent chance of receiving a low-quality house. However, sellers
o f high-quality homes value their goods at $250,000. Sellers o f high-quality homes are
not willing to sell their goods at the prevailing market price. Consequently, high-quality
sellers remove their goods from the market. Considering this, buyers readjust their
willingness to pay to 5200,000, resulting in only low-quality houses being sold. In this
example, low-quality houses drive out high-quality houses.
In the following case, both high and low-quality houses are sold. However, the
presence o f asymmetric inform ation allows sellers o f low-quality homes to receive a
premium for their houses. The assumptions from the prior exam ple apply, except in this
illustration two out o f every three houses in the resale m arket are high quality. In this
case, as before, buyers are unable to identify quality. Again, consum er valuation is
determined by the expected value o f houses offered for sale. Consumers are willing to
pay 5266,666.66 for each house understanding there is a 33 percent chance they purchase
a lemon. This market price exceeds high-quality sellers’ reservation price.
Consequently, both high and low-quality houses are sold in this market. 5ellers o f highquality homes, however, are penalized by the presence o f asymmetric information. With
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perfect information, sellers o f high-quality homes would receive S300.000 for their goods
which exceeds the S266.666.66 that results with asymmetric information.
These illustrations identify the potential for counteracting institutions and market
signals to improve market results. Counteracting institutions include warranties,
advertising, appraisal, and reputation, generally referred to in this study as certification.
Owners opt to certify their house if the benefits o f certification exceed the costs. In the
latter example, if the price o f certification is less than 533,333.33, owners o f high-quality
housing stock opt to certify their good; whereas, owners o f low-quality products do not.
If this were the case, product certification would identify quality. Thus, certification
identifies quality to consumers.
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CH-APTER 3

LITER.ATURE REVIEW
Four areas o f the literature germane to this research include: (I) the im pacts of
adverse selection and asym m etric information on market outcomes, (2) counteracting
institutions that negate the adverse hindrances o f informational discrepancies. (3) hedonic
pricing models, and (4) housing and resale housing market literature. This chapter
summarizes these four areas.
Impacts o f Adverse Selection and Asymmetric
Inform ation on Market Outcomes
The impediments o f asymm etric information on market outcom es are considered
extensively in the literature, m ost notably by .Akerlof (1970), Genesove (1993), and
Greemvald (1986).’ A kerlof (1970) pioneered the discussion o f the hindrances o f adverse
selection and asymmetric inform ation on market outcomes. In m arkets influenced by
asymmetric information, sellers are more informed than buyers about the quality of the
good. Sellers gain valuable inform ation about quality through consumption.
Accordingly, buyers pay a price equivalent to the expected value o f all goods brought to

‘Other articles that consider adverse selection include: Bond (1982), Chezum and
W immer (1997 and 2000), C onlin (1999), Gibbons and Katz (1991), Greenwald and
Glasspiegel ( 1983), Heal ( 1976), Hey and McKenna (1981), K im ( 1985), Lacko ( 1986),
Lehn (1984), Smallwood and Conslik (1979). Stiglitz (1987), and W ilson (1977) and
(1979).
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market. Sellers offer their goods for sale as long as market price exceeds the benefits
they receive from retaining their goods. Since the quality o f the marginal good taken to
market exceeds that o f the average quality offered, owners o f high-quality goods may not
find it optimal to take their goods to market. This removal o f high-quality goods
decreases the average quality o f goods being sold, decreasing market price, potentially
driving sellers o f medium-quality goods out o f the market. This pattern may persist until
only low-quality products are sold. Consequently, in markets influenced by adverse
selection, the quality o f the good sold and the number o f mutually beneficial trades tend
to decrease.
Reduction in mutually beneficial trades is the result o f an externality. Sellers o f lowquality goods do not consider social welfare in their decision-making processes. Since
sellers o f low-quality goods take advantage o f the market, the price that sellers o f highquality goods receive declines. Reduction in the prices received by sellers of high-quality
goods drives some o f these sellers out o f the market. Externalities eliminate mutually
beneficial trades that would occur with perfect information, resulting in inefficiencies.
Genesove (1993) suggests that asymmetric information does not necessarily result in
market failure. Genesove argues that sellers may have reasons other than taking
advantage o f the market to sell their good. Genesove notes that even when asymmetric
information exists, sellers may find it in their interest to offer a portion o f their goods for
sale. He suggests capacity constraints may provide such a reason." If this is the case,
both high and low-quality goods are brought to market. Also, if consumers are able to

"Genesove considers the wholesale used car market in his analysis. In this example, the
capacity constraint would be the size o f the new or used car lot.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

identify seller type by the value o f the good they bring to market, consum ers’ willingness
to pay will differ across seller types.
Greenwald (1986) examines the influence o f adverse selection on the labor market.
He suggests employers discern the productivity o f their employees through supervision.
At the end o f each contracting period, employers opt to continue relations with their most
productive employees, thus driving up the wage o f retained employees. The firm's desire
to retain an employee signals high quality. This leads firms to offer w ages that are
sufficiently low to their least productive employees to force them to change occupations,
results in a signal o f low-quality in the secondhand labor market.
If this was the only reason individuals changed occupations, then only unproductive
employees would migrate betw een jobs. Migration in this case would provide an accurate
signal o f quality to employers. Accordingly, future em ployers’ w illingness to pay would
fully reflect quality. This is not the case, however, since individuals m ay change
occupations for other reasons. Asymmetric information imposes a constraint on both
employers who hire fi-om the secondhand labor market and em ployees who desire to
change occupations. Employers are imable to accurately identif}' the quality of migrating
employees, so they value m igrating employees at the expected productivity level o f the
entire group. Consequently, the presence o f low-quality employees depresses highquality employees’ wages in this market. Employees m igrating for reasons other than
quality receive a lower wage than they would if information w ere perfect. Hence,
asymmetric information lim its the m obility o f labor, because em ployers cannot discern
the productivity o f applicants in the secondhand labor market. This reduces high-quality
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em ployees’ wages in future positions, thereby placing an impediment on their mobility
within the labor market.
.An extensive literature review identified that prior consumption by one market
participant creates an asymmetry o f information. ' Existing literature provides support for
a sim ilar model in the resale housing market. In short, homeowners obtain information
about the quality o f their houses through consumption, and this inform ation is not
available to prospective buyers. Consequently, market outcomes in the resale housing
market should be hindered by adverse selection.
Counteracting Institutions
.Akerlof (1970). Heal (1976), Shapiro (1982) and (1983), Spence (1973) and (1976),
and Stigler (1961) discuss institutions that diminish the impacts o f asymmetric
information.^ In markets where asymmetric information is an im pedim ent, adverse
selection can force owners o f high-quality goods out o f the market. To avoid this
outcome, owners o f high-quality goods attempt to signal quality. This signal may come in
the form o f advertising, warranties, producer’s reputation, and/or certification or
appraisal. If successful, the price that producers o f high-quality goods command in the
marketplace increases. Counteracting institutions potentially increase mutually beneficial
transactions, thus decreasing w elfare losses.

'B ond (1982), Genesove (1993), and Lacko (1986) consider the resale automobile market.
Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) consider the market for slaves in nineteenth century
America. Lehn (1984) considers the market for free agent baseball players. Chezum and
W immer (1997 and 2000) consider the market for thoroughbred yearlings.
■*Other notable contributions to the literature include: Cooper and Ross (1984), Grossman
(1981), Heal ( 1976). Kerton and Bodell ( 1995), Klein and Leffler (1981), Leland ( 1979),
Nelson (1970) and (1974), Schm alensee (1978), and Smallwood and Conslik (1979).
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Advertising improves m arket results when information about price, quality, and
producers is not perfect. It helps identify buyers, sellers, price, and quality, thereby
partially negating asymmetries in information that exist between buyers and sellers.
Stigler (1961) suggests advertising is effective at identifying buyers and sellers in a
market. Search is costly if buyers and sellers cannot identify one another. Advertising
reduces these costs by allowing buyers and sellers to identif}' them selves to one another.
This identification reduces search costs and facilitates trade.
In the resale housing market, real estate agents advertise indirectly. By congregating
buyers and sellers, real estate agents dramatically reduce the search costs o f purchasing a
home. This reduction in costs increases the number o f mutually beneficial trades that
take place in this market, supporting the assertion that advertising plays a prominent role
in the resale housing market.
Also, advertising in the form o f brochures and publications provides information
concerning a house’s directly observable attributes. Following Nelson (1974), advertising
may be a signal o f quality provided by sellers of high-quality goods. Nelson (1974)
suggests a good’s utility per dollar increases with advertising. Producers o f high-quality
goods find it advantageous to identify quality through advertising. This result is driven
by consum ers’ uncertainty about quality. W ith perfect information, advertising increases
production costs, impairing a firm ’s ability to compete. In contrast, when information is
not perfect, producers o f high quality products may find it in their best interest to identify
superior quality through advertisem ent. Otherwise, consumers value quality at the
expected value o f goods offered for sale in the market. Producers o f high quality do not
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receive a price that is in accordance with their quality. Thus, advertising is one method
for producers o f high-quality goods to identify themselves.
In addition, warranties, if feasible, identify a product’s quality. In most cases,
however, complete warranties, which guarantee some level o f quality, are not feasible
because o f adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Spence (1976) and Shapiro
(1982) discuss the impacts that adverse selection and moral hazard have on the market for
complete warranties. The theory o f moral hazard suggests individuals who possess a
complete warranty take actions that increase the probability o f filing a claim. That is, the
ow ner is careless with his or her product, taking risks he or she would not otherwise take
without a warranty. This results in dam ages that would not occur w ithout the complete
warranty. Moral hazard makes complete warranties expensive and inefficient. Likewise,
adverse selection hinders the market for com plete warranties. Individuals who purchase
complete warranties value them beyond their cost. These consumers have the highest
expected claim costs. Thus, only the m ost careless individuals purchase complete
warranties. This drives up the price o f com plete warranties until the price drives all but
the most careless individuals out o f the market.
Spence (1976) suggests that complete warranties are effective only if the sellers of
warranties are certain about the quality o f the product. If the seller is uncertain about
quality, than complete warranties cannot elim inate buyer’s risk o f purchasing a lemon
without placing substantial risk on the seller.
The presence o f warranties in the resale housing market signals that asymmetric
information m ay influence outcomes. However, a warranty’s effectiveness in eliminating
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asymmetric information is impeded by adverse selection, moral hazard, and seller
identity.
A seller's reputation factors im portantly into reducing the hindrances o f adverse
selection on the resale housing market. Heal (1976) disputes A kerlof s (1970) claim that
bad products drive out good. Heal suggests that as long as sellers are partially concerned
about future sales it is not in their best interest to deceive consumers by selling lowquality products. As long as current gains o f selling an inferior good do not exceed the
present discounted value o f future gains from maintaining quality, high-quality goods are
not driven out o f the market. Thus, sellers consider their long-term relationships with
their custom ers before selling low-quality products.
As suggested by Shapiro (1983), reputation is established over time. H e suggests that
in a com petitive industry with imperfect inform ation reputations allow price to exceed
cost. If information is perfect, consumers value goods according to quality and they pay
cost. W hen quality is uncertain, however, consumers are willing to pay a prem ium for
products from sellers who have an established reputation for producing high-quality
products. This premium represents a regular return for investment in reputation. Initially,
high-quality goods sell for less than cost. This initial loss represents an investm ent in
reputation. For producers to be willing to produce high quality, this investm ent in
reputation m akes a regular rate o f return. Consequently, consumers pay a prem ium above
cost for goods from firms with established reputations. Moreover, it w ould seem that
reputation would not alter the market for resale homes. Sellers enter this m arket
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infrequently, elim inating incentives to build and maintain reputations o f selling highquality products.
Despite this, reputation may indirectly affect the market for resale homes. Real estate
agents may have incentives to build a reputation o f selling high-quality resale homes.
Agents who sell low -quality houses, exploiting transaction cost gains, may lose future
customers. Consequently, agents may establish a reputation o f selling high-quality
housing. If this is the case, the real estate agents involved in a transaction m ay signal
quality.
-Appraisal and certification reduce the im pacts o f adverse selection in the resale
housing market.

.Appraisal and certification occur when an expert assesses the quality o f

a house. The appraiser, through direct inspection, reduces some uncertainty about
quality. This reduction in uncertainty reduces the asymmetry in information between
buyers and sellers in the resale housing market. Thus, if certification and appraisal are
effective, the m arket draws closer to the perfect information outcome.
Appraisal and certification do significantly im pact the market for resale homes. It is
commonplace in m ost resale housing markets for appraisal to be a necessary condition for
a home to be sold. This activity identifies quality to both buyers and lenders.
Following G enesove (1993) and A kerlof (1970), the mere existence o f counteracting
institutions in the resale housing market indicates that asymmetric inform ation probably
exists. These institutions become profitable w hen there is a divergence in information
between buyers and sellers. If these institutions are completely effective, the perfect
information result w ill occur. However, it does not appear that these institutions will
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effectively eliminate the asymmetry that exists between buyers and sellers in the resale
housing market.

Hedonic Price Literature
Rosen (1974) provides the seminal work concerning hedonic prices in which goods
can be defined by a set o f “n” objectively defined characteristics. Following Rosen's
notation, a product 'z" with “n’' objectively identifiable characteristics can be defined as
z = (z,. Zn. ..., z„) w here z, measures the amount o f the ith characteristic contained in
each good. Consequently, “z" offers consumers different packages o f characteristics
depending on their preferences, therefore. p(z) = p(Zj z?,..., z„ ). The price o f good “z"’ is
determined explicitly by the combination o f the objectively measured characteristics. The
implicit prices (also known as hedonic prices) o f these characteristics can be estimated
with regression analysis as follows:
p(z) =

B ,z ,

B c j + ... - B ^ ^ -r e

The coefficient B, for each regressor identifies the implicit price consumers are willing to
pay for one more unit o f each objectively identified characteristic.
This method has been utilized extensively in the housing market literature to identify
such things as the value o f environmental amenities as well as the value o f insulation and
comfort. Also, Benson et al. (1998) identify the value o f a view in Bellingham,
Washington. Through hedonic price estimation, Benson et al. quantify the value
consumers place on different types o f views. Results indicate that an inverse relationship
exists between distance and value o f a view.
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My study utilizes hedonic price estimation to determ ine whether or not an inverse
relationship exists betw een price and the number o f tim es a house has been resold. Also,
interaction terms are utilized to determine if this relationship varies with housing size.

Housing Market Literature
Smith et al. (1988) and Blank and W’innick (1953) provide distinguished overviews o f
the housing m arket literature. These authors discuss several key housing market factors
that contribute to this study. These include spatial fixity, housing stock heterogeneity,
transaction costs and com m uting costs, and housing stock durability.
Spatial fixity concerns the permanence o f housing location. Once built, relocation o f
housing stock becomes prohibitively inefficient. This establishes geographical resale
housing markets. Hom eowners who decide to relocate enter the resale housing market as
both buyer and seller, purchasing housing stock in the housing market they are moving to
and selling their current housing stock.
Commuting costs frequently make relocation optimal. These costs include time and
transportation costs, both o f which increase directly w ith commuting distance. Indeed,
over relatively short distances commuting costs can becom e significant. Commuting
costs necessitate relocation if a household decides to pursue occupational opportunities
in a different geographic housing market. Thus, the housing stock consumption decision
is centered upon occupation location.
Relocating costs m anifest in transaction, search, moving, and psychic costs.
Transaction costs include, but are not limited to, various closing, real estate agent, and
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legal fees. Search costs com prise the monetar>' expenses including time necessary to
purchase housing stock. M oving costs include fees paid to move furniture and household
appliances. Psychic costs include those associated with breaking community ties and
having to forge new relationships. According to Smith et al. (1988), relocating costs have
been estimated to be significant, ranging from 8 to 10 percent o f the house’s sales price.
Housing stock is considered a imique durable good. Its useful life, if maintained
properly, spans decades. Through proper maintenance, housing stock value can be
maintained, and through rehabilitation existing housing stock can be increased. The
im portance o f maintenance and rehabilitation ties directly to the issue o f adverse selection
in the resale housing market. Sellers are better aw are o f a house’s maintenance record.
W ithout proper maintenance a house’s quality deteriorates. Since sellers are better
informed about maintenance an asymmetry o f information betw een buyers and sellers in
the resale housing market exists.
Housing stock is heterogeneous. Houses com prised o f different levels o f amenities in
different locations can be priced equally. This is best illustrated by Rosen’s (1974)
hedonic price model. Each objectively identified am enity o f housing stock is valued by
consumers.
M uth (1974) and W einberg et al. (1981) consider the apparent immobility o f
households. They suggest the imposition o f relocating costs is a significant deterrent to
households’ relocating decision. Significant increases in economic variables, such as
income and wealth, induce only modest increases in housing stock consumption.
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The asymmetric inform ation costs suggested herein reinforce these authors’ findings.
Sellers o f high-quality' houses face an asymmetric inform ation cost o f relocating. These
sellers receive a m arket price that does not reflect quality. Consequently, owners o f highquality houses may not find it optimal to increase housing stock consumption when faced
with large increases in econom ic variables (e.g., income and wealth) resulting from the
presence of asymmetric inform ation in this market.

18
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CRAPTER 4

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
Akerlof (1970) pioneered the discussion o f the hindrances o f adverse selection and
asymmetric information on market outcomes. In markets influenced by asymmetric
information, sellers are more informed than buyers about the quality o f the good. Sellers
gain valuable information about quality through consumption. Accordingly, buyers pay a
price equivalent to the expected value o f all goods brought to market. Sellers offer their
goods for sale as long as m arket price exceeds the benefits they receive from retaining
their goods. Since the quality o f the marginal good taken to m arket exceeds that o f the
av erage quality offered, owners o f high-qualit>' goods may not find it optimal to take their
goods to market. This removal o f high-quality goods decreases the average quality o f
goods being sold, decreasing market price, potentially driving sellers o f medium-quality
goods out o f the market. This pattem may persist until only low-qualit}' products are
sold. Consequently, in m arkets influenced by adverse selection, the quality o f the good
sold and the num ber o f m utually beneficial trades tend to decrease.
Genesove (1993) suggests that asymmetric information does not necessarily result in
market failure. Genesove argues that sellers may have reasons other than taking
advantage o f the m arket to sell their good. Genesove notes that even when asymmetric
information exists, sellers m ay find it in their interest to offer a portion o f their goods for
sale. He suggests capacity constraints may provide such a reason.^ If this is the case.

^Genesove considers the wholesale used car market in his analysis. In this example, the
capacity constraint w ould be the size o f the new or used car lot.
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both high and low-quality goods are brought to market. .Also, if consum ers are able to
identify seller t>pe by the value o f the good they bring to market, consum ers willingness
to pay will differ across seller types.
The focus o f this paper is to consider if asymmetric information influences the resale
housing market. First. I examine a household’s relocation decision under conditions of
perfect information following W einberg et al.(1981). These authors identify that
households decide to relocate if the benefits o f relocation exceed costs. The significant
transaction costs that are associated with relocation influence households' housing stock
consumption decisions; suggesting households may consume a suboptim al level of
housing stock in equilibrium. The m odel’s assumption o f perfect inform ation indicates
expected quality in the resale housing market should be identical to the actual quality o f
the universe o f housing stock.* Second, asymmetric information is introduced into
households' relocation decisions. Assuming only two levels o f quality exist in the market
(high and low), owners o f low-quality housing are more likely to relocate than in the case
o f perfect information, whereas owners o f high-quality are less likely. As illustrated in
Genesove (1993), as long as households have reasons to sell their house other than just to
take advantage o f the market, both high and low-quality houses are sold. If information is
asymmetric, however, the average quality o f homes in the resale m arket is lower than the
average quality o f the universe o f housing stock.

°With perfect information consumers are able to identify accurately the quality o f a house.
Thus, they are willing to pay for the quality they receive. The price sellers receive will be
consistent with quality they are selling.
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W einberg et al. (1981) formally develop a model o f the household’s relocation
decision. Central to the relocation decision is the idea of ‘"compensating income
variation- the maximum amount o f m oney that a household could spend on transaction
costs (given the prevailing prices and incom e) and be as well o ff after the move as
before”(334 1981). In short. IC quantifies the amount of money a household is willing to
pay to optim ize housing stock consum ption, holding utility constant.
The benefits o f relocation are not w ithout costs. According to Smith et al. (1988)
households face significant relocating costs (RC). These costs m anifest in transaction,
moving, search, and psychic costs. The sum m ation o f these costs identifies the overall
relocating costs faced by households. This can be shown as

RC = f ( Z S. M. P. a}.
where RC is relocation costs, T is transaction costs, S is search costs, M is moving costs,
P is psychic costs, and a corresponds to all other remaining relocating costs.
A household’s relocation decision depends on both IC and RC. Generally, four
potential other reasons households m ay decide to relocate are suggested herein. These
include to change occupations, to take house price appreciation, to change
neighborhoods, or to increase housing stock consumption as income o r family size
increases or decreases. Thus, if IC is greater than RC. the household should relocate,
otherwise they should not.
I posit another factor affecting the household relocation decision is asymmetric
information between buyers and sellers as to the amenities o f a home. These information
factors can be divided into two sets. The first set is considered observable, for example.
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square footage, presence o f a pool, and num ber o f baths. The second set is factors not
directly observ able; or, if observable, one m ight be expected to value these factors only
after frequent observations. These factors are referred to as latent and include plumbing,
wiring, foundation, environmental amenities, neighborhood amenities, and insulation.
Therefore, since some latent home amenities are almost always present, asymmetric
inform ation is a common feature in the resale market. Homeowners, other things equal,
m ore readily observe the quality o f their hom es’ latent amenities than potential buyers
who are unable to observe the quality o f these amenities without incurring search and
inform ation costs.
Accounting for asymmetric information, IC can be decomposed into two components;
OC and LC. OC measures the gains households receive from altering their consumption
o f observ able housing stock amenities. LC represents the gain or loss that households
expect to receive from selling their home in a m arket influenced by asymmetric
information. LC is the difference between the quality o f a household’s current
consumption o f latent amenities and the quality o f latent amenities the household expects
to receive when thev relocate."

If consumers are risk neutral, the value o f LC is the difference between the quality o f a
household’s current consumption o f latent amenities and the quality o f latent amenities
the household expects to receive when they relocate. If consumers are risk averse LC is
the difference between the quality o f current consumption o f a household’s latent
am enities and the certainty equivalent o f the expected value o f latent amenities brought to
market. The certainty equivalent o f the expected value o f latent amenities is the value o f
latent amenities the consumer would have to receive to be indifferent between a certain
level o f latent amenities and the expected value o f latent amenities brought to market. If
consumers are risk averse the magnitude o f LCs will change but the signs will not.
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Households calculate their IC in each period and decide whether or not to relocate. I
assume that OCs are random ly distributed among owners o f low' and high-quality housing
stock. Furthermore, both buyers and sellers know the distribution o f OCs, LCs, and the
corresponding ICs. Households decide to relocate if benefits exceed the costs.
To develop a benchm ark, the effects o f quality on a household’s relocation decision
are considered w hen inform ation is perfect. In this setting. LC goes to zero. The price
sellers receive reflects the quality o f their house exactly. Those households with OCs that
exceed RC decide to relocate. OC* is defined as the minimum value o f OC necessary for
homeowners to find relocation optimal. Assuming OCs are randomly distributed across
owners o f high and low-quality houses, the average quality o f goods offered for sale is
identical to the average quality o f houses in the overall market. Now consider when
information is asymmetric. To simplify this discussion, I assume two levels o f housing
quality exist in the m arket: high and low quality. Also, potential buyers are aw are o f the
distribution o f high and low-quality houses, but they are unable to observe the particular
LC o f a home. If inform ation is asymmetric, buyers pay according to the expected value
o f houses brought to market.® Consequently, sellers o f low-quality houses receive a price
that exceeds the value o f their good; whereas, sellers o f high-quality houses receive a
price that is less than their hom e’s true value. That is, the LC for sellers o f high-quality
houses is negative, and the LC for sellers o f low-quality houses is positive.

®I assume, following Genesove(1993), that ICs for some percentage o f owners o f highquality housing stock are large enough for them to enter the resale housing market that is
influenced by asymmetric information.
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Households decide to relocate to maximize expected utilitv' if IC exceeds RC or
equivalently i f the sum o f OC and LC is greater than RC. Since LCs are positive for
owners o f low -quality houses and negative for owners o f high-quality houses, a greater
proportion o f ow ners o f low-quality housing stock find relocation optimal in each period
compared to owners o f high-quality housing stock. Since owners o f low-quality housing
are more likely to take their goods to market than owners o f high-quality houses, the
expected value o f houses in the resale market is less than the average quality o f the
universe o f housing stock. Moreover, as the num ber o f tim es that a house is resold
increases, the likelihood that a house is o f low qualitv' should increase.
When inform ation is asvmmetric, the market will clear at a price where the expected
quality o f goods offered for sale is identical to the actual quality offered for sale. At this
price, both owners o f high and low-quality housing stock offer their goods for sale.
Assuming RC is constant for owners o f low and high-quality housing stock, the OC* for
owners o f high-quality housing stock will be greater than the OC* for owners o f lowquality housing stock. OC* is defined as the m inim um value o f OC necessary for a
household to relocate. Consequently, the resale housing m arket suffers from adverse
selection, in that low -quality homes are more likely to be offered for sale than highquality homes. The average quality o f homes in the resale market, in the case of
asymmetric inform ation, is less than the average quality in the resale housing market
when information is perfect.
This relationship can be illustrated with an example. Consider the case where one
hundred houses com e to market, fifty high-quality and fifty low-quality. Consumers
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value low-quality houses at S 180,000, and high-quality houses at 5200,000. If
asymmetric inform ation exists, consumers are willing to pay $190,000, thus LC is
$10,000 for ow ners o f low -quality houses and -510,000 for owners o f high-quality
houses. Consider the case when ten owners o f low and high-quality housing stock have
OCs o f 540,000, tw enty owners o f low and high-quality housing stock have OCs o f
$20.000, and the rem aining owners have OCs o f $10,000, where relocating costs equal
$12,000. In this example, every owner o f low-quality housing stock finds relocation
optimal, but only the ten ow ners o f high-quality housing stock, with OCs o f $40,000, do
so. Since a portion o f owners o f high-quality housing stock exit the market, low-quality
houses are adversely selected reducing the m arket price to $183,333. When participants
leave the m arket LCs also change, potentially driving all but the lowest-quality houses out
o f the market. However, the price o f $183,333 is an equilibrium in this example since
actual quality brought to m arket equals expected quality. So, ten owners o f high-quality
housing stock and fifty owners o f low-quality housing stock still decide to relocate. The
following table illustrates the relocation decision o f each market participant discussed in
this section.
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An Illustrative Example o f the Influence o f
Quality on a Household’s Relocation Decision
Housing
Stock
Owner

No. o f
Homes

LC

OC

RC

OC ^ LC > RC

Relocate
Decision

Lowquality

10

-510,000

540.000

512,000

518.000

Yes

20

-510,000

520,000

512,000

-52.000

No

20

-510,000

510.000

512,000

-512,000

No

10

510.000

540.000

512.000

538.000

Yes

20

510,000

520,000

512,000

518,000

Yes

20

510,000

510,000

512,000

510,000

Yes

High
quality

This analysis shows that the resale housing market can be divided into separate submarkets where average quality differs based on a hom e's resale history. The price
consumers are willing to pay for homes is different in each o f these markets, holding
other things constant. Thus, price should be decreasing in the number o f times a house is
resold.
I have shown that when asymmetric information influences the resale housing market,
the average quality o f homes offered for sale is lower than the average for the over all
housing stock. This analysis could be replicated for houses that have been sold once,
producing similar outcomes. In this case, houses sold twice would be o f a lower average
quality than those only sold once. Similarly, houses that have not been resold would be
o f a higher average quality than those sold once.
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The challenge is to identify a way to measure whether or not adverse selection affects
the market for resale homes. Genesove (1993) suggests if consumers are able to
differentiate seller type by the level o f quality they bring to market, we expect to see
consum er’s willingness to pay to be different across types o f sellers. In the resale housing
market, one measure that could identify type of seller is the number o f a times a house has
been resold. Turnover measures offer a test for the presence o f adverse selection in the
resale housing market. As a house’s turnover rate increases, holding other things constant,
consum er’s willingness to pay should decrease.
This result, however, depends on the efficiency o f counteracting institutions in
relieving the asymmetry o f inform ation in this market. In m arkets affected by asymmetric
information, incentives arise for third parties to provide counteracting institutions to
improve market results. Counteracting institutions include warranties, advertising,
appraisal, and reputation, generally referred to in this study as certification. Owners opt
to certify their house if the benefits o f certification exceed the costs. Owners o f highquality houses may find certification optimal since market price is not consistent with the
value o f their home. If only two levels o f quality (high and low) exist, only owners o f
high-quality' houses would consider certification. If only owners o f high quality certify,
the premium sellers o f low-quality housing stock receive from selling their home would
be eliminated. However, if the cost o f certification is prohibitive, asymmetric
information still affects outcomes in this market.
Risk aversion increases the demand for certification on the buyer’s side. Risk averse
consumers are w illing to pay a premium to avoid an actuarially fair gamble. This
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prem ium is com m only referred to as the risk premium. The purchase o f latent amenities
in the resale housing market can be considered a gamble since there is uncertainty in the
quality that will be received. To simplify, I continue to exam ine the case when only two
levels o f quality exist in the market: high and low. If quality is uncertain consumers will
purchase either high-quality latent amenities with a probability cf rj and low-quality latent
amenities with a probability o f l-ry. A risk averse consum er is willing to pay a premium
to avoid the uncertainty that exists when qualitv' is uncertain.
If the value o f latent amenities is increasing in investment size, so is the risk premium
consumers are willing to pay for certainty. The risk prem ium that consumers are willing
to pay is directly related to the variance o f the uncertain outcom e. As the value of latent
am enities increase so will the variance o f the uncertain outcom e. Thus, the risk premium
that consumers are willing to pay to avoid this gamble should be increasing in investment
size. Consum er’s risk premium directly affects sellers’ w illingness to pay for
certification. The value o f certification is increasing in the size o f the risk premium.
If the utilization o f certification increases with investment size, 1 would expect the
relationship between price and turnover rate to erode w ith investm ent size. That is to say:
c ( â LNPrice / â Turnover Rate)/à Turnover Rate>0.
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CHAPTER 5

DATA AND MODEL
A data set o f 1,048 resale housing market transactions drawn from the Clark County
Assessor’s database was collected from the area o f Clark County, Nevada for transactions
occurring in O ctober o f 1999. This data set consists o f information on sales price and
housing characteristics for each transaction, including data on number o f bedrooms,
num ber o f bathroom s, square footage, number o f fireplaces, presence o f pool, housing
type, and year o f first sale. These data also identify the address for each house being
resold. In addition, data were also collected from the Clark County Assessor’s Website
(http://www.co.clark.nv.us/assessor). Each observation’s resale history was also
collected from this source.
The data set includes one dependent variable and three categories o f independent
variables. The dependent variable is Price, where Price is the sales price for resale
homes transacted in Clark County, Nevada, during October o f 1999. The categories o f
independent variables include Observable Amenities, Community-, and Latent Amenity
Proxy variables. A complete description o f each o f my variables and their expected signs
is provided in Table 2 in Appendix I.
In order to hold constant for each observation’s objectively identifiable manifest
amenities a set o f Observable Amenity’ variables are included. These variables include

29
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Age. .Acreage, Average Room Size. Bath, Fire, Pool, One-story, and Square Footage.
Age is the difference between the year o f transaction and the year o f first sale. As with
most durable goods a direct relationship between age and depreciation is expected.
Average Room Size was calculated by taking the quotient o f square footage and the
number o f bedrooms. Bath and Fire identify the number o f bathrooms and fireplaces for
each observation, respectively. Indicator variables include Pool, and One-Story’, which
are set equal to one if the house has the amenity, and zero otherwise. The variable Square
Footage is the number o f living square feet.
Community’ variables identify the importance o f location in the valuation o f housing
stock. To capture location’s importance, eight regional dummy variables o f the Clark
County area are introduced: Downtown, East, Henderson, Northeast. Northwest, South,
Southwest, and Summerlin. These regions were developed by considering commercially
available print publications from real estate agents in Clark County, Nevada.
Finally, the Latent Amenity Proxy variable identifies if asymmetric information
influences the resale housing market. This variable is Turnover Rate. Turnover Rate
equals the number o f times each observation has been sold (not including initial sale)
divided by its age.
Appendix I, Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. In aggregate, the
sample’s mean sales price is 5149,891 with a standard deviation o f 578,581. The mean
square footage is 1,775.81 with a standard deviation o f 696.61. Furthermore, the average
turnover rate is 0.2756 per year with a standard deviation o f 0.3042.
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Box-Cox estimation was utilized to identify the appropriate transform ation of the
dependent variable. The Box-Cox transform identifies the logarithmic functional form to
be the appropriate specification for this data set. Box-Cox is a maximum likelihood
iterative estimation technique that perm its identification o f the transform that provides the
best fit for the data set. The Box-Cox transform equation is;

y'^ = ry^ - 7>/X
Lambda equal to one, zero, and negative one identify linear, logarithmic, and reciprocal
functional form specifications, respectively. The lambda calculated for this hedonic
equation equaled -0.1734 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.0988 to
-0.2383. This suggests that the logaritfimic transform ation o f the dependent variable is
appropriate one among the three most frequently used transforms for this data set.
Consequently, LNPrice is utilized as the dependent variable, where LNPrice is the natural
log o f sales price for homes transacted in Clark County, Nevada during O ctober o f 1999.’
The Ramsey Reset test (regression specification error test) is utilized to determine the
appropriate transformation o f variables. The Ramsey Reset test {Reset) is a general test
that tests for omitted variables, incorrect functional form, and violations o f the
assumptions o f ordinary least squares. The null hypothesis for this test is that the model
is correctly specified. Conversely, the alternative hypothesis is that the model is
incorrectly specified. Reset tests for om itted variables and functional form
misspecification by re-estimating the m odel including the powers o f the fitted values o f

’The natural log transformation o f price is consistent with a priori expectations. This
transformation ensures that all predicted values will be positive. Since the model predicts
values o f price this constraint seems appropriate.
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the dependent variable from the nested model. If the powers o f the fitted values do not
significantly improve the goodness o f fit the null hypothesis should be accepted,
identifying that the model is adequately specified. Two specifications o f these data that
allowed the null hypothesis to be accepted at conventional levels are utilized to test the
hypothesis that price is decreasing in the num ber o f times a house is resold. These
specifications which are referred to as Quadratic include the following set o f independent
variables: Latent Amenity Proxy, Age, Acreage, Average Room Size, Bath, Fire, Pool,
One-story. Square Footage, and Square Footage^. One specification includes Community
variables, the other does not.
To determ ine if the relationship betw een price and the number o f tim es a house is
resold is robust, several other specifications w ere tested. These include specifications for
which Square Footage is included linearly and logarithmically {double-log).

The

double-log is reported in addition to quadratic specification and includes Age, Bath, Fire,
LNAcreage, LNAverage Room Size, LN Square Footage, Pool, and One-story as the set o f
Observable Am enity variables, where LNAcreage, LNAverage Room Size, and LNSquare
Footage are the natural logs o î Acreage, A verage Room Size, Square Footage,
respectively.
Utilizing these data, two hedonic price m odels are estimated to determ ine if
asymmetric information influences the resale housing market. The hedonic pricing model
equation is.

10

The Reset tests’ null hypothesis was rejected in both o f these specifications.
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Above, I have argued that sellers may employ certification to address problems o f
asymmetric information. The most direct way to test such an hypothesis is to obtain
information on whether or not such a mechanism is employed. These data unfortunately
could not be collected to include these variables directly. However, I expect the value o f
certification to be increasing in the size o f the home. An indirect test for the utilization o f
certification is to examine whether the relationship between price and turnover rates
varies with housing size. Thus, from Equation 1.
B,Latent Am enity Proxy = f (Square Footage)
To test this hypothesis, a second Latent Amenity Proxy variable that interacts
Turnover Rate with LNSquare Footage is included in the double-log specification to
consider the relationship between price and the number o f times a house has been resold
as square footage changes.” Expanded from Equation 1:

LNPrice = Bg + B ,Observable Amenities + B^Community +
(B^ -i- BjLNSquare Footage) Turnover Rate e

^

Further,

LNPrice = Bg + B ,Observable Amenities + BnCommunity>
B^Latent Amenity’ Proxy + e

(Eq. I)

” The double-log transform was utilized to model the relationship between price and
turnover as square footage changes since it is a parsimonious model, consistent with
economic theory, that takes into account the nonlinearities between price and square
footage present in the data.
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LNPrice = + B .Observable Amenities + B -Community’
■B ^Turnover Rate+ BJLNSquareFootage * Turnover Rate + e

^

The partial deriv ative o f LNPrice with respect to Turnover Rate identifies the relationship
between price and turnover rate for different sizes o f housing stock, which is:

c LNPrice / â Turnover Rate = B3

B4LNSquare Footage

(Eq. 4)

I expect that an increase in a house’s turnover rate should decrease consumer’s
willingness to pay for that house, holding other things constant, and this relationship may
erode as the size o f investment increases if the value o f certification is increasing in size
o f investment or mathematically â (o LNPrice / c Turnover R ate)/â Turnover Rate is
positive.
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CH.APTER 6

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tables 3, 4, and 5 in Appendix I include empirical results. Table 3 shows the findings
for two regression equations that correspond to the quadratic specification in which
Turnover Rate is the only Latent Am enity Proxy variable introduced. Table 4 illustrates
the results o f two regression equations that correspond to the double-log specification in
w hich Turnover Rate is the only Latent Amenity’ Proxy’ variable introduced. Table 5
includes two regression equations that correspond to the double-log specification for
which both Turnover Rate and Turnover Rate *LNSquare Footage are included as Latent
Amenity’ Proxy variables. Column 1, in each table, does not include Community
variables, whereas column 2 does.'*
Empirical results reinforce expectations for O bservable Amenities and Community’
variables. That is. manifest amenities and location appear to influence housing price.
The variables Age, Average Room Size, Fire. LN.Acreage. LNAverage Room Size,
LNSquare Footage, Pool, One-Story, Square Footage, Square Footage' are statistically
significant in each regression equation for which they are included. Also, Northwest,
Northeast, Central. East, and Southwest are statistically significant in each equation for

‘“Results o f regression equations for which Square Footage was entered linearly were
provided results similar to that o f the quadratic and double-log models.
35
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which they are included. Northwest, Northeast. Central, East each have a negative
coefficient, whereas Southwest has a positive coefficient. Acreage, South, and Summerlin
are not statistically different from zero in any regression equation in which they enter.
The Latent A m enity Proxy variables are o f interest to m y model. In the quadratic
regression equation that does not include Community’ variables, the Turnover Rate
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. In the double-log regression
equation that does not include Community’ variables, the Turnover Rate coefficient is
negative and has a p-value o f .112, indicating an inverse relationship exists between
turnover rates and price. However, this variable, w hile rem aining negative, becomes
insignificant when Com m unity variables are included. The p-value for Turnover Rate
drops to 0.246 and 0.686 for the quadratic and double-log specifications respectively.

Although these results are consistent with expectations that a relationship exists
between price and turnover rates, I believe that this form o f the model does not capture
fully this relationship. Variables that should be included to fully capture these data
include differences in demographics across regions, the uncertainties about quality that
may decrease in established neighborhoods, and the presence o f counteracting
institutions.'" A lthough data were not collected for these variables, below I test indirectly

'"Central to my argum ent is that consumers are uncertain about quality in the resale
housing market. To test i f perceptions o f turnover rates are different in more established
parts o f towns or in regions with larger concentrations o f m inority households, the two
oldest regions in the data set were omitted. These regions are also relatively concentrated
with minority households. W hen these regions are om itted, the coefficient on Turnover
Rate, when Com m unity variables are included, becom es statistically significant.
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for the influences o f counteracting institutions on the resale housing market.

Also of interest are the regression results that include Turnover Rate H NSquare
Footage as a second Latent Amenity’ Proxy’ variable. The coefficients for each Latent
Amenity Proxy’ variable in these equations is statistically significant. This regression
indicates the relationship between price and turnover rate varies w ith housing size. The
partial derivative o f LNPrice with respect to Turnover R ate is negative up to 2,050 square
feet and positive thereafter in the regression that does not include Community’ variables,
spanning over approxim ately 80 percent o f the data set. This partial derivative is negative
up to 1,820 square feet and positive there after in the regression that includes Community
variables. A 95 percent confidence interval was estim ated for this partial derivative. This
confidence interval identified that this partial derivative is statistically less than zero for
houses less than 1700 square feet, not statistically different from zero for houses ranging
from 1700 to 2900 square feet, and positive for houses greater than 2900 square feet in
the regression equation that does not include community variables. Further, this
confidence interval identified that this partial derivative is statistically less than zero for
houses less than 1500 square feet, not statistically different from zero for houses ranging
from 1500 to 2300 square feet, and positive for houses greater than 2300 square feet in
the regression equation that does include commimity variables. Figures 2 and 3 in
Appendix I plot the relationship between price and turnover as square footage changes for
each regression equation.
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In general, my results are consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric information
influences the resale housing market. An increase in a house’s turnover rate decreases
consumer’s willingness to pay for that house, other thing constant. Further, it has been
shown that this relationship depends on housing size. D epending on the value o f
certification, owners o f high-quality housing stock may certify their goods in order to
signal quality. As investm ent increases, consumers may be w illing to pay a premium for
housing stock that is identified to be o f high quality. Thus, the relationship between
turnover rates and price is increasing in housing size.
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CONCLUSION
The presence o f asymmetric information in the resale housing market appears to
influence market outcomes. Ow ners acquire information through consumption that
buyers do not, creating an asymm etry in information. Since owners o f low-quality houses
gain more from relocation than owners o f high-quality houses; the expected quality o f
houses on the market is lower than the expected quality o f the aggregate stock o f houses.
Moreover, as the num ber o f tim es that a house is put on the m arket increases, the
likelihood that a house is o f low -quality increases. Thus, the expected quality o f houses
offered for sale is decreasing in the num ber o f times they are resold. M y results suggest
an inverse relationship exists betw een price and the num ber o f times houses are resold,
w hich is consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric inform ation influences outcomes
in the resale housing market. T his result provides several valuable insights into the
housing market literature.
My results may provide another explanation for the household immobility presented
by Weinberg et al. (1981). Transaction costs impede the relocation decision o f
households. As transaction costs increase, few er households relocate. In addition, the
presence o f asymmetric inform ation also assesses a cost to relocating households. When
asymmetric information exists betw een market participants, the less-informed market

39
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participant pays a price consistent with expected value o f houses offered for sale. Thus,
the price that owners o f high-quality housing stock receive is depressed. This externality
reduces mutually beneficial trades in the resale housing market, thus reducing the number
o f households that find relocation optimal. Although transaction costs are the primary'
explanation for household immobility, the presence o f asymmetric information appears to
be a valid extension.
Future research should attempt to identify both the im portance o f counteracting
institutions in the resale housing market and the primary reason sellers relocate. Data on
individuals and why they m ove or where they move to would be helpful. This
information may be available to consumers at the tim e o f purchase, thereby altering their
willingness to pay. Further, data from another geographical housing market should be
collected and a similar test be constructed. In addition, Clark C ounty's dynamic housing
market may not be descriptive o f less robust markets. This hypothesis may be better
supported by data collected in a more established geographical housing market. These
data could possibly be collected via Metroscan and local county assessors’ offices. Also,
variables more capable o f identifying the intricacies o f neighborhood characteristics
should be included.
Another extension to this theory would include the num ber o f days a house is on the
market as the dependent variable while maintaining the same independent variables.
One potentially credible signal is to forego the benefits o f m oving by refusing offers that
are not consistent with value. Since sellers o f low-quality hom es are expected to receive
a premium for selling their hom es; such a signal is likely to be prohibitively costly for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

41

them. Thus, owners o f high-quality housing stock can signal quality to the market byleaving their house on the m arket until the price they receive more closely reflects quality.
So, an inverse relationship between days on the market and turnover rates should exist,
other things constant. Since owners o f low-quality housing stock are receiving a price
that exceeds value, if asymmetric information exists they are more likely to accept offers
than are owners o f high-quality' housing. This hypothesis could be tested with a hazard
rate model.
In any case, the presence o f asymmetric information in the resale housing market
appears to affect outcomes. As a house’s turnover rate increases, consumers reduce their
willingness to pay for that home, other things constant. This relationship also varies with
investment size. Risk averse consumers willingness to pay for certification increases with
investment size. M y empirics are consistent with this hypothesis.
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Coefficient Expectations
Variable Name

Description

Expected
Sign

P rice

The sales pnce o f a subset o f houses transacted in Clark County,
Nevada dunng October o f 1999.

N/A

L N P rice

Natural log o f Price.

N7A

L a ten t A m e n ity P ro xy

Variables that attempt to identify if a relationship exists between
pnce and the number o f times a house has been resold.

N/A

T urnover R ale

Equals the number o f times sold, not including initial sale,
divided by age.

Positive/
Negative

T urnover R ate '
LM Square F o o ta g e

Turnover R ate multiplied by L N S q u a re F ootage.

Positive/
Negative

O b serva b le A m en ities

Includes all independent variables consumers are able to identify
and accurately value during their search process.

A crea g e

Size, in acres, on which the house resides.

Positive

Age

Difference between 1999 (transaction year) and the year o f first
sale.

Negative

A vera g e R oom S ize

Produced by dividing living square feet by number o f bedrooms.

Positive

B ath

Number o f bathrooms in the house.

Positive

F ire

Number o f fireplaces the house possesses.

Positive

L N A crea g e

The natural log o f size, in acres, on which the house resides.

Positive

L N A vera g e R oom S ize

The natural log o f the quotient o f square feet and number o f
bedrooms.

Positive

L N S q u a re F o o ta g e

Number o f total living square feet for each house.

Positive

O n e-S to ry

Dummy variable that identifies if a house is one or two stories.
This variable takes the value o f one if the house is one story and
0 is the house is two stories.

Positiv'e

Pool

Dummy variable that identifies the presence o f a pool. This
variable takes on the value o f 1 if a pool is present and 0 i f a
pool is not present.

Positive

S q u a re F o o ta g e

Number o f total living square feet.

Positivée

S q u a re Footager

Number o f total living square feet squared.

Negative

C o m m u n ity

Regional dummy variables that attempt to quantify the value o f
location in the price o f housing stock.

D ep en d en t V ariable
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Table 1 (continued)
D ow ntow n

This variable takes on the value o f I if the house resides in zip
codes 89101,89102, 8 9 1 0 4 ,8 9 1 0 6 .8 9 1 0 7 and 0 otherwise.

Positive
Negative

E ast

This variable takes on the value o f 1 if the house resides in zip
codes 89121. 89120. 89109, 89122 and 0 otherwise.

Positive
Negative

H enderson

This variable takes on the value o f 1 if the house resides in zip
codes 89012. 89014. 89015 and 0 otherwise.

Positive/
Negative

N ortheast

This variable takes on the value o f 1 if the house resides in zip
codes 89115, 89110, 89030. 89031 and 0 otherwise.

Positive/
Negative

N orthw est

This variable takes on the value o f 1 if the house resides in zip
codes 89130, 89131. 89108 and 0 otherwise.

Positive/
Neganve

S outh

This variable takes on the value o f 1 if the house resides in zip
codes 89119 and 89123 and 0 otherwise.

Positive/
Negative

Sou th w est

This variable takes on the value o f 1 if the house resides in zip
codes 89103. 89113. 8 9 I I 7, 89118 an d 0 otherwise.

Positive/
Negative

Sum m erlin

This variable takes on the value o f 1 if the house resides in zip
codes 89128. 89129. 89134 and 0 otherwise.

Positive/
Negative
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics*
Variable Name

Mean

Standard Deviation

L N P ric e

11.83

0.393

T u rn o ver R ate

0.276

0.304

Turnover R a te ' L N S q u a re
F o o ta g e

2.0612

2.2967

A c re a g e

0.188

0.545

Age

14.810

13.062

A v e ra g e R oom

534.69

153.43

B a th

1.9519

.5387

F ire

0.801

0.642

L N A c re a g e

-1.887

0.4711

LNA verage R o o m S ize

6.2461

0.2608

L N S q u a re F o o ta g e

7.418

0.346

O n e-S to ry

0.679

0.467

Pool

0.2145

0.411

S q u a re F o o ta g e

1.7-75.815

696.616

S q u a re F ootage^

3,638.335

3.492.630

D o w n to w n

0.138

0.345

E ast

0.089

0.2859

H en d erso n

0.168

0.374

N o rth e a st

0.155

0.362

N o rth w est

0.108

0.310

S o u th

0.063

0.243

S o u th w e st

0.099

0.299

S u m m erlin

0.179

0.384

*Number o f observations used was 1,048.
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Table 3. Two Regression Equations That Include Turnover Rate as the Only Latent Am enity Proxy
Variable (quadratic specification). T-statistics using white standard errors in parentheses.
Variable

LN P rice

L N P rice
{Com m unity’)

C onstant

10.863***
(210.021)

10.9278***
(206.622)

T u rnover Rate

-0.030**
(-2.279)

-0.0149
(-1.160)

Age

-0.0083***
(-15.089)

-0.0071***
(-10.920)

A crea g e

0.0158
(1.167)

0.0149
(1.041)

A vera g e Room

0.0005***
(6.504)

0.0004***
(5.619)

B ath

0.0044
(0.299)

0.0097
(0.673)

F ire

0.0287***
(2.609)

0.0107**
(2.102)

O ne-Ston-

0.0635***
(4.978)

0.0726***
(5.923)

Pool

0.0899***
(6.289)

0.0901***
(6.351)

S q u a re Footage

0.00047***
(15.230)

0.0004***
(14.366)

S q u a re Footage-

-2.70E-08***
(-4.919)

-2.19E-08***
(-3.820)

D ow ntow n

-0.615***
(-2.975)

E a st

-0.0631***
(-2.828)

N ortheast

-0.1311***
(-7.729)

N orthw est

-0.0412**
(-2.429)

South

0.0057
(0.318)

Southw est

0.0447**
(2.222)
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Table 3 (continued)
S u m m e rlin

0.0195
(1.227)

Number o f Observations

1048

1048

R-squared

0.8353

0.8510

F-statistic

343.07

225.82

Note; Henderson excluded regional dummy variable.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: Two Regression Equations That Include Turnover Rate as the Only Latent A m enity Proxy
Vanable {double-log specification). T-statistics using white standard errors in parentheses.
Variable

L N P rice

L N P rice
{C om m unity)

C onstant

5.8813***
(18.902)

6.397***
(20.296)

T u rn o ver Rate

-0.0176
(-1.190)

-0.00047
(-0.032)

Age

-0.0081***
(-13.899)

-0.0071***
(-10.513)

B ath

0.0241
(1 562)

0.0318**
(2.094)

L N A crea g e

0.1038***
(4.022)

0.1129***
(4.255)

L N A vera g e Room

0.2821***
(7.629)

.2389***
(6.583)

F ire

0.03519***
(3.196)

0.0324***
(2.961)

L N S q u a re F ootage

0.5908***
(16.532)

0.5682***
(16.10)

O n e-S to rv

0.0434***
(2.795)

0.0513***
(3.386)

Pool

0.0922***
(6.362)

0.0931***
(6.397)

D ow n to w n

-0.052***
(-2.437)

E a st

-0.0643***
(-2.913)

N o rth ea st

-0.1285***
(-7.451)

N o rth w est

-0.0539***
(-3.104)

South

-0.0192
(-1-114)

S o u th w est

0.0478**
(2.261)

S u m m erlin

0.0224
(1.401)
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Table 4 (continued)
Number o f Observations

1048

1048

R-squared

0.8287

0.8442

F-statistic

335.83

211.52

Note: Henderson excluded regional dummy variable.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 5. Two Regression Equations Including Both Turnover R ate and Turnover Rate •LN SquareFootage
as Latent Am enity Proxy Variables {double-log specification). T-statistics using white standard errors in
parentheses.
Variable

L N P ric e

L N P ric e
{C om m unity)

C on sta n t

6.145***
(19.302)

6.601***
(20.876)

T urnover R ate

-1.113***
(-3.211)

-1.110***
(-3.423)

Turnover R a te * L N S q u a re
F ootage

0.1460***
(3.151)

0.148***
(3.393)

L N A crea g e

0.0982***
(3.824)

0.107***
(4.065)

Age

-0.0082***
(-14.241)

-0.0073***
(-10.873)

LNA vera g e R oom

0.2809***
(7.964)

0.2381***
(6.590)

B ath

0.0213
(1.401)

0.02900**
(1.942)

F ire

0.0346***
(3.074)

0.0311***
(2.837)

LN Square F o o ta g e

0.5559***
(14.944)

0.5323***
(14.449)

O n e-S to ry

0.0436***
(2.843)

0.0514***
(3.433)

Pool

0.0942***
(6.459)

0.0951***
(6.514)

D ow ntow n

-0.053***
(-2.479)

E a st

-.0651***
(-2.992)

N o rth ea st

-0.1302***
(-7.520)

N o rth w est

-0.0555***
(-3.182)

South

-0.0211
(-1.231)

S o u th w est

0.0471**
(2.226)
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Table 5 (continued)
Sum m erlin

0.0196
(1.215)

Number o f Observations

1048

1048

R-squared

0.8301

0.8457

F-Statistic

320.86

213.85

Note: Henderson excluded regional dummy variable.
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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Figure 1. Relationship Between LNPrice and Turnover Rate Over the Relevant Range
o f Square Footage (no Community variables).
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Figure 2. Relationship Between LNPrice and Turnover Rate Over the Relevant Range
o f Square Footage (with Community variables).
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